Sunday, October 11, 2009

“From Sancak to ‘St. Jacques’: The Armenians of Sancak Camp Fall Victim to Gentrification"


Walking down the newly created sidewalk that cuts through what was the center of Sancak Camp, I saw a woman making her way through the rubble towards me with her purse in one hand and a cane in the other. When we came face to face she asked me in Armenian, “My girl, are you lucky?” Not knowing how to answer her question, I said “a little.” She returned with a request, “I am going to play the Lotto, I thought maybe you could give me some numbers, and if you are a lucky person, I will win.” My companion and I provided six numbers off the top of our heads. When we handed her the numbers she said, “Maybe God will look down at me and give me a little luck.” Taking a gamble on the Lotto provided better chances of finding a solution to the problem of Sancak Camp than relying on the municipality of Bourj Hammoud, Armenian charities, and churches, all of whom have yet to offer tangible solutions to the residents who have been expelled and others who face the same fate with the next stage of demolition.

Sancak Camp is an easy place to miss. It’s tucked back behind a bustling shopping center in Bourj Hammoud and next to the high speed traffic along the Qarantina highway. It’s one of the last standing Armenian refugee camps in Bourj Hammoud; however, it was not created in the wake of the 1915 Armenian Genocide like many other camps were, instead its residents were refugees from the 1939 Turkish annexation of Alexandretta. The name “sancak” means “province” and refers to the lost “sancak of Alexandretta” from which the original Armenians of Sancak Camp hail. The camp lies, ironically, behind the building that houses the Bourj Hammoud municipality. Before its demolition, Sancak Camp contained about 300 shops and homes that housed about 160 families. Today, the remains of the camp lies in shambles with less than 45 homes still standing after two stages of demolition over the past year and a half. The composition of Sancak Camp was complex when it was fully intact. On the one hand, it was composed of Armenian refugees from Alexandretta, the only remaining residents today as all other squatters have been removed. However, as demolitions took place in the past, such as the Tyro Camp demolition one block away, some Armenian families moved to the Sancak Camp rather than to other parts of the city. This means that some of the Armenians living in the camp are the descendants of the original Armenian refugees from 1915. The motivations for moving from camp to camp are likely economic because as prices rise throughout Lebanon these slums are some of the cheapest housing for the Armenian working poor. Over the years, other communities entered the camp as Armenians moved out of the camp into Bourj Hammoud, Antelias, Zalqa and other surrounding regions, some sold or rented their homes to new residents who were sometimes immigrants from Syria, Southeast Asia and Armenia. By the time of demolition, Deputy Mayor Raffi Kokoghlanian estimated that only 30% of the camp’s original population was Armenian.

When Bourj Hammoud municipality purchased the land, they began confiscating homes of squatters by lifting the tin roofs off shanties in order to prohibit new squatters from moving in. Some of this was done in haste, evidenced by the personal belongings scattered throughout the rubble: shoes, clothing, children’s toys, and posters. There are a number of socio-economic factors that have led Armenians to continue to live in these slums. Sancak Camp homes are cheaper than the houses available throughout the city. This is especially true as these residents lack purchasing capital. The irony is that the Armenian myth of affluence bars the wider Armenian community from recognizing this as a problem within their own community, keeping solutions far from hand. Reactions from Armenians I have interviewed have ranged from denial as one Armenian doctor in Antelias told me, “These are not Armenians! Armenians are not poor!” Another Armenian characterized the residents as lazy and seeking hand-outs, in his words, “they need to work to build their own homes.” One Armenian social service worker said that that the Sancak community was full of “prostitution, gambling, and incest” as a way to distance herself from the problem. The impression I was left with was that Armenians in the wider community had outlandish stereotypes about the poor in their community. True enough; the profiles of the Armenians who remain in Sancak today are quite grim.

Thirteen-year old Katiya, who is a rare half-Armenian half-Arab resident of the camp has quit school to sew with her aunt to help provide for her family. Her sister Fadiah, who is seven, feels no incentive to attend school any longer and just plays in the rubble of the camp all day long. Their father, a professional fisherman by trade, has had trouble finding sustainable work. Until recently, they lived in one room; the only one left of their house after the last demolition tore all the houses along one side of their home part of which left ¾ of their house unlivable.They have since left the camp and I am not certain of their whereabouts.The rubble from the last demolition has yet to be cleared away even though it took place more than six months ago making the viewer recollect photos taken after the Nazi bombing of London. The current condition of the camp—pools of running water from pipes, pieces of old furniture, and partially standing walls from now disappeared homes—further emphasizes the general carelessness of the municipality and the developers towards the residents.

Indicative of a number of residents I met, Azniv and Hripsmae are both elderly. They keep each other company as their grown children are off at work. Azniv has a walker in front of her, but told me that she doesn’t use it as she is unable to stand without assistance. Her son works as a tow truck driver. Another relative, Taquhi, next door helps out; until recently she worked in a clothing factory but has since lost her job. Upon my most recent visit Taquhi, stressed by the continual flooding of her home and pressures within the camp, dizzied and fell in the rubble injuring her nose and forehead. The family is hoping for some help from relatives in the U.S. when the time comes to buy a place and get out of the camp. Help is hard to come by in Bourj Hammoud itself as most are apathetic about the fate of the remaining Armenians of the camp.

Most families in the camp reported that they were receiving about $3,000-$5,000 compensation from the municipality, which is better than nothing, but still not enough to purchase even the simplest apartment in Bourj Hammoud. Some residents have resisted taking the compensation in hopes that a group freeze out with the municipality will result in better compensation. As those residents grew demoralized, they took the money and left, but a few have continued to hold out. However, those who did take the compensation and whose homes were demolished were not able to afford proper housing. So, Hripsimae, for example, used to live in the camp until her home was demolished six months ago; she moved to the neighboring 90-day camp (Dokuz Iyilik) across the highway which is yet another small refugee camp of about 10 homes. In contrast, some of the spaces within Sancak are workshops and vendors. One Sancak resident, Ara, is in a comparably better situation than the others; he has already moved his home outside the camp and only had his small shoe factory left. He complained that he was not selling shoes like he used to, Asian competition, poor market conditions, and fear of another war in are affecting his profits. He has since left the camp and his factory has been demolished. The municipality is under pressure to provide better access to the commercial district of Bourj Hammoud, especially its prize Souq Arax commercial center. The Qarantina highway that runs next to the back end of the camp provides quick access to Bourj Hammoud for shoppers passing by. The ease of stopping off the highway can already be noticed by the frequented Antakiya kebab stand that sits on the highway, a favorite of drivers who can make a quick stop for lunch. The kebab stand is on the farthest rim of the camp and will be demolished within the next two years leaving the owner at a complete loss. The owner of Antakiya kebab, as others, had no plans for the future. All along the highway, the tin roofed shanties serving as shops that range from snack shops, pet stores, as well as shops selling baskets and brassware. In the new development plans, those shops will be replaced with new ones selling various kinds of crafts and goods on the bottom floor. I asked the developer, Vasken Chekijian, about the plan, whether the same businesses will be able to open on the new development site, he noted that it would be unlikely as the rents will be too high for those shopkeepers to afford. The new site, ironically called St. Jacques Plaza, a strange play on “Sancak,” will have some artisan shops and other businesses on the bottom floor. Above the shops will be residences, low-income housing for Bourj Hammoud’s working classes.

In an interview with Mr. Kokoghlanian and Mr. Chekijian, they reported that the municipality intends to sell the apartments at cost to the future residents, at no profit to themselves. Projected costs of the apartments will be $45,000-50,000 for two-bedroom apartments and $65,000-75,000 for three-bedroom apartments. I asked deputy mayor Mr. Kokoghlanian if he expected any of the original residents of Sancak Camp to reside at Jacques Plaza. He commented that the income level of the original residents was too low to make living in the new apartments affordable. The plan is to encourage retention of Armenians in Bourj Hammoud as there has been immigration to other suburbs, a phenomenon that over the decades has led to Armenians living in Antelias, Zalqa, and other northern suburbs over the Bourj Hammoud suburb. The municipality hopes to create an environment to sustain the Armenian population, at least the preferred middle class Armenians, and this plan is as good as any to provide incentive to young Armenians to stay rather than move away. There will also be a large parking structure on the site to try to solve the municipality’s parking shortage and hopefully bring more commerce into the city. The municipality purchased the land, which had been owned by first the Ghandour and Hilwani families, and then was sold to a corporation called Yanco in the 1970s. The municipality bought the land specifically to initiate this project. So far, the demolition of half the camp has resulted in a two-lane road with sidewalks designed to bring traffic into Bourj Hammoud. This has left about 90 residents in the camp as of January 2007; however, almost half of them are gone now as another part of the remaining camp was demolished six months ago. The final residents are living in the leftover rubble from the last demolition. Some homes are partially demolished which has left some living in the only remaining habitable room, as dangerous walls surround their other living space. In some places, damaged water lines pour water over the mounds of rubble. The best solution to the residential crisis lies in finding low income housing for the expelled residents from Sancak Camp. One municipality worker went to great lengths to find a run-down building in Bourj Hammoud that could be refurbished cheaply and apartments given to Sancak Camp residents in lieu of the small compensations they were being offered. The plan prepared some time ago has yet to be set into action by the authorities although it is often quoted in conversation. When I asked about its implementation to the planners, I was told that there was no movement to implement the housing plan for former residents. Then again, one would think that such a plan, if it were indeed taken seriously by the mayor’s office, would have been well underway if there was any intention to look out for the now homeless Sancak residents. Now that most of the camp is gone, only about 15% of it stands today, and the final remains are slated for destruction in about two years, hope is something far from hand. Some former residents have moved into some of Bourj Hammoud’s remaining slums and decrepit buildings. Families may be living on the $3,000-5,000 dollar compensation paid to them by the municipality. When it runs out, it’s difficult to say where they will go. Residents who were shopping for homes reported to me that they were not finding anything less than $25,000 on the real estate market. They were also not able to get loans from the local banks that would cover the difference.

In terms of charitable organizations, there were some based in the camp prior to the first stage of demolition over a year ago: the Red Cross, sisters of Jesus and the Jenishian hospital. However, those services are no longer easily accessible and residents were quick to complain that no help was reaching them. Out of concern, I decided to visit Seta Pamboukian, the director of Jenishian, it was apparent that Sancak was not a priority for the organization, in part due to budgetary restraints. The director pointed out that “the municipality gave residents the opportunity to move into government housing near the stadium of Bourj Hammoud, but they did not take it.” Importantly, Pamboukian commented that other refugee camps, like “Tyro Camp was much more of a community. It had a school and a church for instance, while Sancak Camp is much more transient.” According to Pambukian, the fact that the camp had been used by squatters placed it in another category, one that rid the organization of any social responsibility for the residents. In fact, most Armenians I spoke with either did not know about the camp or viewed the residents with disdain and indifference. So, in that respect, Jenishian was no exception to the norm.

The 20,000 square meters that comprise Sancak Camp lays at a crucial intersection, not only for the commercial vitality of Bourj Hammoud, but also for the moral consciousness of the greater Armenian community. What is to happen to those residents facing the pressures of gentrification in Bourj Hammoud? Will Armenians continue to ignore the social and economic factors that have contributed to the persistence of this Armenian refugee camp for over sixty years? These are not easy issues to deal with as the myth of Armenian affluence is quickly shattered by the presence of these Armenian working poor of Sancak Camp whose homes are about to become a parking lot for St. Jacques Plaza. Then again, if the greater Armenian community doesn’t want to face this problem, who will?

Thursday, January 3, 2008

Gender Trouble in Bab al-Hara II


Ramadan is an exciting time for TV viewers across the Middle East and this season is no exception. There are so many programs for viewers to choose from such as the epic biography of “King Farouq,” that features Syrian actor Taim Hassan as the Egyptian monarch and “Saqaf al-‘Alam (Top of the World) that presents the travels of Ibn Fadlan told against the backdrop of a Syrian graduate student whose thesis project is to translate the twelfth-century traveler’s writings while studying in Denmark. The story takes place during the protests over the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. But definitely the talk of Damascus and the Arab World is “Bab al-Hara II,” the second in a series of tales from a fictitious Damascene old quarter called “Harat al-Dab‘” (“Hyena quarter”) during the French Mandate period. The series has been proclaimed the most popular Ramadan series of 2007. The story features the central character, the Barber Abu ‘Issam (Abbas al-Nouri) enjoyed a life of prestige as the brother-in-law of the leader of the quarter (za‘im) Abu Shihab (Samer al-Masri). The basic conflict in the series begins with gender trouble between two households who are linked together by marriage. Abu ‘Issam’s wife, Su‘ad (Sabah al-Jaza’iri) and her neighbor, Fariyal (Wafa’ Mussali), whose daughter also happens to be married to her son ‘Issam, despise each other and eventually a very public brawl erupts between the two women. The humiliation caused by Su‘ad’s confrontation the neighbor embarrasses Abu ‘Issam to the point that he scolds his wife. During that confrontation, Su‘ad, a strong and vocal woman, tosses some fateful words at her husband, one of many previous conflicts between the couple, and her husband responds with a single verbal divorce. This divorce initiates an endless cycle of misery throughout the Ramadan month not only in the household but throughout the entire quarter.

After this divorce, contrary to the standard practices of the quarter, Abu ‘Issam refuses to kick his ex-wife out of the house and sleeps in his shop, presumably because it is haram for him to live under the same roof. Soon, neighbors start to suspect Abu ‘Issam of wrongdoing, especially as he takes interest in a female resident after overhearing thieves in the middle of the night who plan to raid her home not only for goods but possibly rape her as well. The thieves plan to dress like women in a full face covering, in order to conceal their identity. Abu ‘Issam begins to communicate with the woman whose house is targeted. It is then that his ever so observant neighbors, not knowing the full story that includes the thieves, believe Abu ‘Issam is a womanizer. Through this gossip, his reputation is tarnished as is his family’s. Soon, news of his divorce is released through a ring of gossip throughout the entire community, beginning with women, and later through the community of men. Abu ‘Issam’s daughter’s fiancĂ© breaks things off after being pressured by his family to distance himself from the family because of the stigma of a divorced mother-in-law (Su‘ad). Abu ‘Issam son’s worsening relations with his wife, especially as the conflict between his mother and mother-in law set off the initial problems in the quarter, ends in divorce as well. Ultimately, Abu ‘Issam is pushed to a worse extreme when his brother-in-law takes his wife Su‘ad to his house making reconciliation even more difficult.

Abu ‘Issam also makes things worse for himself as he is often by himself, brooding, rather than informing his neighbors about his divorce, and even worse, about the thieves roaming the hara. As unidentifiable veiled women walk through the hara, Abu ‘Issam follows them suspecting them of possible crime, yet every time he does, the watchful eyes of the shopkeepers view his actions as lecherous. Finally, in a moment of suspicion he yanks the full face veils from the heads of two women to dish out the final humiliation to himself and the hara and results in near war between two quarters.

“Bab al-Hara II” is an imaginary Damascus, a nostalgic journey to a day when honor, reputation and manhood were supreme. The serial is filmed on a set designed to look like the old city of Damascus. Each home is laden with beautiful objects of priceless value, inlaid mother of pearl chairs, tables, cabinets. Many people I have discussed the program with view it as an authentic representation of Damascus and its traditions, many Syrian serials have been using this genre as it invokes a sort of historical pride in its viewers. For the historian, however, it’s much less historical as the line between imaginary and historical is quite blurred. Part of Abu ‘Issam’s predicament, according to the program, is his inability to reconcile with his wife after the divorce. We find out that he has actually verbally divorced her once before, yet, anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of Islamic law knows that two divorces is not an irrevocable triple divorce. Abu ‘Issam repeatedly informs the viewer that his wife is now haram to him; therefore, he has to sleep in his shop and is unable to return to his home where she still resides. He attempts reconciliation unsuccessfully with a shaykh at his side (something completely unnecessary as he is not actually divorced). So, why is reconciliation so difficult? Why did the producers of the serial decide to change the criteria of divorce? Was it because a triple divorce would make reconciliation much more difficult as it would demand Su‘ad marry another man before reconciling with her husband? Furthermore, the role of the shaykh is greatly amplified in the series. It is understood that only he can reconcile the couples in the series. The most absurd scene involving the shaykh occurred when ‘Issam asked the shaykh to serve his divorce to his wife, unable to utter the words in person.

That being said, “Bab al-Hara II” is excellent entertainment. Is hosts a variety of highly skilled Syrian actors that have a long tradition in the Ramadan serials produced here. Articles have been written in the popular press concerning the revival of traditional Damascene vocabulary from the series in everyday speech throughout Syria as well as analysis of psychologists concerning why such escapism is appealing to the viewing public. Everyday in Damascus conversations abound about the daily happenings of the program, questions as to how far the catastrophe of Abu ‘Issam’s house will reach? Will Abu ‘Issam and his wife reconcile? Will a wave of divorce overtake Harat al-Dab‘? But for this viewer, gender trouble prevails as the men in the program are caricatures of Damascene manhood; there are constant references to manhood, “aren’t you a man yet?” or “be a man!” Probably the best contrast to this prevailing image of Damascene manhood, is Abu ‘Issam’s neighbor, Abu Badr, who is overpowered by his wife who constantly ridicules him as weak and less than a man. The viewer is beat over the head with this image as Abu Badr cowers through the streets afraid of men and women alike.

Manhood is also demonstrated through the treatment of women in the series. On two occasions, ‘Issam beats his wife in a very disturbing scene for her alleged role in the chaos that has affected his family. Jamila, Abu ‘Issam’s daughter speaks to a baker from the other side of the door, without being seen; however, it is enough for her to be scolded by her father and for her male relatives to suggest this shame is enough to warrant justifiably killing her. But this is not all, the female characters have no role in decision making, they are ordered around by their husbands and sons and virtually secluded in their homes with no public roles whatsoever. Women have no agency, and when they do assert it, it’s in a negative and destructive way. Female agency is only offered by way of the troublesome neighbor, whose feud with Su‘ad kicked off the season. Eventually, Fariyal turns to black magic in order to try to reconcile her daughter with her husband. Repeatedly, she insults the people around her to the point that everyone comments that her tongue is long (lisanha tawil) and needs cutting, a euphemism for a woman who not only talks too much, but is often rude and disrespectful while doing so. What kind of message does this send to the viewer, especially as it is, for some, representative of tradition and historical values? At the same time, I am glued to the TV every night to find out how this cycle of misery will be resolved. Others are waiting to see if Fariyal, painted as the true villain, will have a change of heart. Eventually, after being ostracized for her troublemaking, she does change her ways. The series ends with most of the divorced couples reuniting, and promises for more reunions next season, we will have to wait and see.

Still, embedded in the storyline is the initial trouble between a man and wife, and how a wife’s unruly behavior begot a series of troubles throughout the neighborhood. Something within this initial story is very telling about a gender fantasy in which uncontrolled wives have the ability to spread chaos (fitna) throughout an entire community. Su‘ad is that woman as is her neighbor Fariyal, the latter representing the worst kind of gender trouble as she is completely uncontrollable, disrespectful and has engaged in witchcraft, just in case her evil nature was not already apparent to viewers. At the end of the season all parties are reconciled, the viewer is left with the understanding that the women whose dispute caused a cycle of suffering are to blame for the chaos that ensued. Patriarchal control, in the form of divorce, spousal abuse, and social control, solves the conflict in the hara. Perhaps one of the most disturbing aspects of “Bab al-Hara II” are the comments I have heard as I discussed the series with shopkeepers and residents here in Damascus. Some of the comments range from criticism of the program as being silly, full of gossip more than storytelling, and slow moving (which is very true of some of the 30 chapters). Other comments have been that what is being represented is the true traditions of Damascus, one customer in a shop commented that Damascenes should return to the traditions related in “Bab al-Hara II.” The shop keeper did not agree and began a conversation about which traditions he thought were not worth reviving. Some Damascenes have expressed a dislike of the program arguing that it represents more conservative values that they personally reject. One Damascene housewife told me that she thought that the female characters represented strong women. She was unable to tell me exactly what made them strong, but this was her overall impression of the women in the series.

Despite its disturbing gender messages, “Bab al-Hara II” is great entertainment. The first series was so popular that it generated lesser quality knock offs that can be found on other channels. There are promises of a third season in which the quarter leader, Abu Shihab may find himself married. However, at least here in the Old City of Damascus, almost any time of the day during the month of Ramadan, you can walk through the streets and hear “Bab al-Hara II” blaring from the TVs in throughout its neighborhoods. In fact, it’s a great time to escape the long lines at the bakeries.

Friday, August 24, 2007

Welcome to Ya mal a-Sham!!


Ahlan wa Sahlan! This blog has been created in order to post events during my sabbatical year in Damascus and Lebanon. I welcome my students , friends and any other party interested in Syrian and Lebanese culture and politics. I will begin periodic postings in early September and hope to provide information on the happenings and developments on the ground.